Archiv der Kategorie: Internationales Krisen- und Konfliktmanagement

Ziviles Peacekeeping – zivile Friedenssicherung

Ziviles Peacekeeping  – zivile Friedenssicherung

Von Christine Schweitzer

Beim Zivilen Peacekeeping geht es um den Schutz von Menschen vor Gewalt in Konfliktsituationen und die Prävention von Gewalt durch Präsenz von Friedensfachkräften, die unbewaffnet vor Ort aktiv sind.

Ziviles Peacekeeping (oder Unbewaffneter Ziviler Schutz – Unarmed Civil Protection, wie dieser Ansatz im Englischen heute heißt) basiert darauf, dass unbewaffnete, ausgebildete zivile Fachkräfte in einem Konfliktgebiet eine ständige Präsenz aufbauen. Sie verbinden Aktivitäten, die direkt der Gewaltprävention dienen, mit solchen, bei denen es darum geht, Konfliktparteien zusammenzubringen und die Fähigkeiten lokaler Gemeinschaften zu stärken, Gewalt-Eskalationen zu widerstehen.

Wie kann das gehen?

Viele Menschen finden es schwer zu verstehen, was unbewaffnete Friedensfachkräfte in einem gewaltsamen Umfeld erreichen können, da sie daran gewohnt sind zu denken, dass Gewalt die einzige Quelle von Schutz sein kann. Es ist wahr, dass unbewaffnete Zivilist*innen keine Mittel haben, etwas direkt zu erzwingen und sich auch nicht mit Waffengewalt verteidigen können. Sie können Angreifer*innen nicht töten oder durch Schüsse stoppen, wie Soldat*innen. Unbewaffnete Peacekeeper*innen haben jedoch ihre eigenen Quellen von Macht, und die Erfolgsbilanz der letzten Jahre gibt ihnen Recht: Unbewaffnete Peacekeeper*innen sind zum einen – zumindest bis zu einem gewissen Grad, der von Ort zu Ort unterschiedlich ist – gegen Gewalt geschützt, wenn es den Teams gelingt, vertrauensvolle Beziehungen zu allen Konfliktparteien und zu den Menschen vor Ort aufzubauen. Vorbedingung dafür sind Unparteilichkeit und Unabhängigkeit von staatlichen oder anderen partikularen Interessen, seien diese ökonomischer, missionarischer oder politischer Art. Die Tatsache, dass sie selbst relativ sicher sind, überträgt sich dann auf diejenigen Personen, die sie begleiten. Zum anderen riskiert ein*e potentielle*r Angreifer*in, dass die internationalen Friedensfachkräfte gewaltsame Übergriffe weltweit bekannt machen, und dass dies wiederum negative Folgen für den*die Angreifer*in hat. „Die Welt schaut zu“ ist oft ein wirksames Präventionsinstrument.[1]

Aufgabenbereiche

Aufgabenbereiche des Zivilen Peacekeepings sind vorrangig der Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung in Kriegssituationen; der Schutz von besonders bedrohten Gruppen und Gemeinschaften, wie z.B. Vertriebenen oder ethnischen Minderheiten, dort wo Übergriffe gegen solche Gruppen drohen; die Beobachtung von Waffenstillständen, und die Schutzbegleitung von Menschenrechtsverteidiger*innen. Darüber hinaus beteiligen sich Zivile Peacekeeper*innen aktiv am Aufbau und der Stärkung von lokalen Systemen der Frühwarnung und des frühen Handelns gegenüber drohender Gewalt.

Durchführende

Ziviles Peacekeeping wird bislang in erster Linie von Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NROs), praktiziert, darunter die Peace Brigades International (PBI), zahlreiche in Palästina tätigen NROs und die Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP). Seit mehr als fünfzehn Jahren setzt die Nonviolent Peaceforce Ziviles Peacekeeping erfolgreich in Bürgerkriegsgebieten, unter anderem auf den Philippinen, im Südsudan, Myanmar und im Nahen Osten (Irak, Syrien) ein.

Politische Anerkennung

Ziviles Peacekeeping hat durchaus internationale Anerkennung, auch auf der staatlichen Ebene, erfahren: Zum einen haben Staaten und internationale (Regierungs-)Organisationen selbst unbewaffneten Missionen durchgeführt. Beispiele sind die Truce Monitoring Group in Bougainville am Ende der 1990er Jahre und die Kosovo Verification Mission der OSZE 1998-1999. Das Gleiche gilt auch für Kirchen – man denke an die Beobachtung der Wahlen in Südafrika 1994 (EMPSA) und die Arbeit des Ökumenischen Begleitprojekts Palästina-Israel des Weltkirchenrates (EAPPI) in Palästina seit 2001.

Zum anderen wird die Arbeit der Nonviolent Peaceforce durch eine Reihe von europäischen Regierungen und die EU-Kommission seit 2003/2004 staatlich finanziert. Allerdings reichen diese Mittel bei weitem nicht aus. Die Nonviolent Peaceforce alleine könnte in viel mehr Ländern und mit viel mehr Personal tätig sein, wenn es dafür genügende und schnell verfügbare Mittel gäbe. Eine Friedensfachkraft bei Nonviolent Peaceforce kostet pro Jahr weniger als 50.000 Euro (2016 waren es, berechnet auf Basis der Gesamtausgaben der Organisation, genau 50.000 US-Dollar). Soldat*innen in Auslandseinsätzen kosten mindestens das Doppelte.[2]

Des Weiteren erfahren NROs, die Zviles Peacekeeping durchführen, staatliche Anerkennung, wenn sie von Regierungen in konfliktbetroffenen Gesellschaften eingeladen werden, um den Friedensaufbau zu unterstützen. Hier ist erneut die Nonviolent Peaceforce das wichtigste Beispiel. Sie hat in den Philippinen seit 2010 offiziellen Status in der „Zivilen Komponente“ des Internationalen Monitoring Teams, das den Friedensprozess zwischen der Regierung und MILF auf Mindanao überwacht. Im Südsudan kooperiert sie eng mit UNICEF, und auch nach Myanmar ist sie auf Einladung der Regierung in Einsatz. Schließlich hat Ziviles Peacekeeping Anerkennung bei den Vereinten Nationen gefunden. So hat die Nonviolent Peaceforce in Kooperation mit dem UN Institute for Training and Research einen e-learning Kurs über Ziviles Peacekeeping entwickelt. Des Weiteren wird das Konzept in mehreren UN-Berichten der jüngeren Zeit erwähnt, so etwa im HIPPO Bericht (ein Bericht eines Hohen Unabhängigen Panels 2015 zu Friedensoperationen), im Peace Architecture Bericht und im Women, Peace and Security Bericht zur Umsetzung von UN-Resolution 1325.

Auch die deutsche Regierung hat 2017 das Instrument anerkannt. In den Leitlinien „Krisen verhindern, Konflikte bewältigen, Frieden fördern“ heißt es: „Die Bundesregierung unterstützt die Weiterentwicklung ziviler Ansätze im Rahmen des R2P-Konzeptes und der Reform der VN-Architektur zur Friedensförderung, wie sie vom High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations gefordert werden. Dabei fördert sie insbesondere Ziviles Peacekeeping als erprobte Methodik, um Menschen vor Gewalt und schweren Menschenrechtsverletzungen zu schützen.“

Dr. Christine Schweitzer ist Geschäftsführerin beim Bund für Soziale Verteidigung, wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin beim Institut für Friedensarbeit und Gewaltfreie Konfliktaustragung, Vorsitzende der War Resisters’ International und Redakteurin des vom Netzwerk Friedenskooperative herausgegebenen Friedensforum. Sie hat vielfach zu den Themen Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung, gewaltfreie Alternativen zu Rüstung und Militär und verschiedenen Konfliktregionen publiziert.

Fußnoten

[1] Eine lesenswerte vergleichende Studie zu Zivilem Peacekeeping ist: Furnari, Ellen (Hrsg.) (2016): Wielding Nonviolence in the Face of Violence, Institut für Friedensarbeit und Gewaltfreie Konfliktaustragung, Norderstedt: BoD.

[2] Für deutsche Einsätze liegen keine genauen Zahlen pro Soldat*in vor. Frankreich beziffert die Kosten für seine Soldat*innen auf 100.000 Euro pro Soldat*in und Jahr.

Environmental peacebuilding: What is it good for?

Environmental peacebuilding: What is it good for?

Von Nina Engwicht

Environmental peacebuilding strives to reduce conflict risks associated with natural resources and to enable societies to profit fully from their natural resource wealth. In order to be successful, it must follow a context-sensitive approach. Nina Engwicht shows that, in Sierra Leone, the environmental risk factors for conflict have only been addressed at the surface.

Environmental peacebuilding in post-conflict societies

Policy interventions seeking to break the link between natural resource abundance and violent conflict aim to tackle the quality of environmental governance both in producer countries and global markets. Proponents of such peacebuilding efforts hold that effective reforms in conflict-prone natural resource sectors can enable transitional societies to mitigate conflict risks, build cooperative societal relations around environmental management and reap the benefits of their resource endowment. The rationale that better natural resource governance will reduce the risk for conflict and human rights violations has informed the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, the EU Conflict Minerals Regulation, and many other initiatives tackling natural resource governance at the global, national and local level.

Sierra Leone: A model case?

One of the first and most prominent cases of reforms aimed at curbing the production and trade in conflict resources was in the Sierra Leonean diamond sector. During an 11-year long civil war, Sierra Leone gained sad notoriety for its trade in “blood diamonds”. Since the end of the war in 2002 the mineral sector has been thoroughly reformed. Sierra Leone was one of the first members of the Kimberley Process, which aims to regulate the global trade in rough diamonds through government-issued certificates guaranteeing that a given parcel of diamonds is “conflict free”. Sierra Leone is also a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which seeks to make industry payments to governments transparent, and has been declared EITI-compliant in 2014. On the regional level, the country has harmonized its export taxes with adjacent diamond producing countries in an effort to curb smuggling. Institutional changes at the national level have been extensive. They have included legal reforms; the establishment of a National Minerals Agency charged with monitoring the implementation of regulations in the diamond sector; the development of a cadastral system; and the institution of a Diamond Area Community Development Fund, channeling back a small percentage of tax income derived from diamond exports to diamond mining communities.

At first glance, the results seem to point to an extraordinary success. Diamond exports have gone up – from an export value of only 1.2 Mio USD during the war to 158,000 Mio USD in 2016. Most importantly, diamonds have not “spoiled” the peace in Sierra Leone. The armed actors that controlled the diamond market during the war have effectively disappeared, and with them the violent modes of production and trade that characterized the market.

Lack of market oversight undermines policy goals

However, a closer look shows that many of the fundamental structures of the Sierra Leonean diamond market have hardly changed. To this day, diamond production is characterized by hundreds of thousands of impoverished artisanal miners working under miserable conditions, while the benefit of industrial mining operations to the country remains highly questionable. Large parts of the production and trade remain illegal. While illegally sourced and traded diamonds are mostly channeled into the legal market, this reveals a significant lack of state capacity in the oversight of the market.

Lastly, the structures of inequality that have characterized the market for decades and have constituted one of the root causes of the civil war remain in place. Marginalized young men hoping to escape poverty gravitate towards diamond mining, but even in the unlikely case that they find valuable gems, the prevalent systems of knowledge and power thwart their chance for upward social mobility.

A superficial look at the results of natural resource sector reforms would suggest that the main causes linking diamonds to conflict in Sierra Leone have been eradicated. This is far from the truth. If environmental peacebuilding is to be successful, it must be based on an understanding of the complexities of local configurations of governance, conflict and market structures that might prove to be extremely resilient to change.

This article first appeared on A New Climate for Peace and is republished here.

 

Playing Fair With Sanctions: Is There a Method to the Madness?

Playing Fair With Sanctions: Is There a Method to the Madness?

by Enrico Carisch

Criticisms over a lack of fairness of United Nations sanctions and inconsistencies in their application are frequent and routine — and not without justification. For decades, human-rights experts have pointed to the paradox that unreliable practices, in the words of one expert, render „the UN sanctions system noncompliant with the UN’s human rights standards.“

This unacceptable paradox is mostly due to unbridled power-politics played by the permanent-five members (P5) of the Security Council — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States — who blunt the aspirations of the 10 elected members to correct these failures.

According to a new study by United Nations University, a wave of „47 fair process challenges to UN sanctions from 12 jurisdictions“ clog courts, revealing how often individuals and companies are confronted with an assets freeze or travel ban despite questionable evidence.

Due process standards are intended to regulate how violators are listed for targeted sanctions measures and how to remove them from such lists. A major improvement was the establishment of an independent and impartial Office of the Ombudsperson in 2009, tasked with reviewing delisting requests from UN sanctions. Never loved by the P5 and because of internal personnel shifts, the office has been vacant since August 2017.

Ideally, due process is reinforced with solid evidentiary standards that help UN experts conclude who may have violated sanctions. The standards are also strengthened by reliable methodologies for the work of experts and delegations of the Security Council’s sanctions committees. Periodic lapses in methodology or evidentiary standards — caused in almost in all cases by pressure from the P5 — leave concerns about due process, sometimes in seemingly inconsequential contexts.

One recent example is the methodology section of reports by the panel of experts on South Sudan. The experts regularly omit that there is actually no arms embargo in place in South Sudan, a result of an unresolved standoff between the proponents — Britain and the US — and Russia on the opposing side.

This presents peculiar challenges to the experts‘ work because their arms specialist is nevertheless mandated to „gather, examine and analyse information regarding the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel, including through illicit trafficking networks.“

The obvious contradiction of monitoring illicit trafficking without an arms embargo opens up unprecedented complexities that should be addressed with a tailored methodology. So far, readers of the reports by the South Sudan expert group must guess the basis in which the arms expert categorizes trafficking networks as licit or illicit and which networks should be reported or not.

Not surprisingly, in the experts‘ most recent report (S/2017/326), „networks“ are variously described with adequate factual information or a tangle of innuendo. For example, a series of paragraphs describes a possible attempt to sell Panthera armored vehicles to South Sudan by a company based in Cairo. In one paragraph, the allegation is debunked by two unspecified „sources“ claiming that the alleged transaction was part of an embezzlement scheme. The expert declares in the next paragraph that the role of Egypt in the conflict of South Sudan was „a frequent source of tension in the region.“

Yet nothing in the report justifies the leap from conjectures about a private company’s activities to the expert’s swipe at Egypt. When the report was published, the Egyptian delegation at the UN was justifiably enraged but received little sympathy from the P5.

It is an unfortunate reality that allegations based on unsubstantiated affiliations or circumstantial evidence are found in UN expert monitoring reports more often than they should.

The most recent case is found in the latest report of the expert group on Yemen. On the one hand, the experts say of ballistic missiles fired by Yemen’s Houthi fighters into Saudi Arabia that „as of yet, [they have] no evidence as to the identity of the supplier, or any intermediary third party.“

Yet in the next paragraph, the experts cite „the Islamic Republic of Iran as non-compliant with the UN sanctions.“

The experts base their allegation on the routine, technical recapitulation (paragraph 14 of Resolution 2216) found in many sanctions resolutions that reminds all countries to „take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of embargoed goods to targeted individuals and groups.“ Because no enforceable norms defining „necessary measures“ are spelled out, this provision has never been used in 20 years of UN sanctions to accuse a member state of negligence.

Nevertheless, 11 of the 15 members of the Security Council recently went along with a British draft of a resolution that reiterated the experts‘ contrived allegation that the „Islamic Republic of Iran is in non-compliance.“ Perhaps unaware of the potential risks to future sanctions of embracing aberrations of evidentiary norms, the 11 members joined Britain, forcing a Russian veto and then a different vote to adopt a more balanced Russian-authored resolution.

That resolution does not mention the poorly substantiated missile issue, but it correctly calls out the preponderance of evidence for the heavy humanitarian price Yemenis are paying for the Saudi bombardments on civilians.

Deteriorating methodologies reverberate throughout the structure of sanctions implementation and monitoring, as illustrated by the Libya sanctions. After the well-designed Resolution 1970 was turned into the controversial regime-change and no-fly zone Resolution 1973 in March 2011, the situation in Libya turned into a humanitarian calamity. This tragic turn of events required the Security Council in 2014 to add a sanctions-designation criterion for violators of human rights and international humanitarian law.

Yet no expert with the requisite human-rights training has ever been appointed to the Libya expert group. Given the inherent complexities of human rights and international humanitarian law investigations in conflict regions, the question remains how the experts should develop evidence against potential abusers of human rights and humanitarian law.

Perhaps the Ombudsperson vacancy and random interpretations of evidentiary standards and working methodologies are symptomatic of creeping neglect by Council members or simply a sense of being overwhelmed by the due process challenges to UN sanctions?

Concrete ideas to improve clear and fair procedures throughout the UN’s sanctions system exist. In addition to reanimating the Ombudsperson office, advocates of due process should also focus on preventing innocent individuals, companies or state officials from being targeted in the first place.

The table below summarizes ways to enhance the implementation and monitoring system of sanctions. (The table is annexed to the assessment report that the Australian government supported financially.)

This article introduces a new column, P5 Monitor, looking at how the permanent members of the UN Security Council — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States — handle UN sanctions.

Situation Responsible sanctions actors Due process requirements
Start of mandate Expert group, sanctions committee Develop and adopt evidentiary standards, working methods for collection and handling of evidentiary material, as well as reporting standards
Decision to initiate a specific monitoring/ investigation Expert group, sanctions committee Credible prima facie information must meet reasonable standards that justify experts’ inquiries and information requests

Consider all exculpatory information

Monitoring or investigations of specific situations Expert group, sanctions committee Verify prevalence of evidence

Review exculpatory information

Ensure right of reply is provided to target, while taking all precautions to preserve the effectiveness of an eventual asset freeze and respecting any Member State’s national security prerogatives

Ensure evidence for culpability meets expert groups’ methodology standards

Reporting of findings Expert group Report all pertinent evidence, including exculpatory information

Report substance of replies by target

Describe conditions under which the right of reply was granted

Consideration of expert group reporting and evidence in confidential annexes Sanctions committee Verify that presented evidence was collected in accordance with United Nations and experts’ own methodologies and standards

Verify authenticity of reported evidence

Verify that right of reply was granted and exercised

Verify that efforts were undertaken to seek and report exculpatory information

Post-designation Sanctions committee Ensure that target is informed about designation

Ensure that target is advised about opportunity to communicate new information to the expert group

Ensure that target is aware of Focal Point and Ombudsperson

Ensure periodic review of designation criteria

Petitions to Focal Point/ Ombudsperson Sanctions committee Ensure that relevant expert group is consulted Communicate decisions and their reasons to target
Granting of exemption Sanctions committee Ensure that relevant Member States inform law enforcement organizations and related organizations about specific exemptions
Post-designation monitoring Sanctions committee, expert group Maintain continual monitoring of designee to ensure that reasons and criteria for designation remain valid
Delisting Sanctions committee Ensure that delisting decision is communicated to all relevant Member States

Ensure that all relevant United Nations documents reflect the delisting

 

This article first appeared on PassBlue and is republished here under a Creative Commons license.

 

Enrico Carisch is the co-author of the just-released book „The Evolution of UN Sanctions: From a Tool of Warfare to a Tool of Peace, Security and Human Rights.“ He is also a co-founder and partner of Compliance and Capacity Skills International (CCSI), a New York-based group specializing in all aspects of sanctions regimes (http://comcapint.com).

Among other organizations, Carisch has worked for the UN Security Council as a financial and natural-resources monitor and investigator on sanctions violations by individuals and entities in Africa and elsewhere. Previously, he was an investigative journalist for print and TV for 25 years.